Why We Can't Wait

In Chapter Seven, King discusses the aftermath of the campaign in Birmingham. He opens the chapter by recounting the 1938 execution of an African-American boy with the newly-approved method of poison gas. As he was executed, the boy called on African-American boxer Joe Louis to save him, a plea that King sees as indicative of the “helplessness, the loneliness, and the profound despair of Negroes during that period” (133).

By contrast, the events of 1963 reveal that African-Americans now have a sense of their own ability to fight against injustice through nonviolent direct action. According to King, the biggest impact of Birmingham is that African-Americans have now shaken “off three hundred years of psychological slavery and said: ‘[w]e can make ourselves free’” (135). Their actions forced “[w]hite America…to face the ugly facts of life” (135).

This hopeful development did not end setbacks, however. The “partial and grudging compliance” (136) of the May agreementwas greeted with violence. Four little girls were killed when white supremacists bombed the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church during Sunday school, Birmingham law enforcement killed a child in the streets, and several white boys killed a little black boy who was riding his bike. Even worse than the murders themselves was the almost universal lack of response by whites in power.

White business interests stayed on the sidelines. Northern businesses like U.S. Steel, which had business interests in Birmingham, refused to intervene, in part, King speculates, because they benefited financially from segregation in Birmingham. Had they pushed for changes, King believed their financial leverage would have made a difference in Birmingham.

Seeing this lack of progress, naysayers labeled it a serious blow to nonviolent direct action as an effective means of addressing segregation. King’s response to these criticisms is to cite the example of the American farmers who fought against the British at Bunker Hill during the American Revolution. Although they lost the battle, the psychological impact of their daring became an inspiration for the colonists, culminating with the victory of ordinary Americans over the powerful British. In Birmingham, the seemingly small gains were a “fuse” that inspired even greater achievements (139).

King further explains that he wanted to take advantage of this momentum by having more demonstrations after the bombings, but local leaders opposed this plan. He accepted their decision but believes the question of whether Birmingham will respond without more demonstrations is an open one.

King opens the second part of the chapter by pointing out that “[n]o revolution is a ballet” (141). The spontaneous nature of the civil-rights movement meant the cities were randomly selected based on the African-American leadership in those cities and how poorly the power structure responded. Some racially-progressive cities were targeted to make more progress toward equality. In other cities—including Jackson, Mississippi, where civil rights leader Medgar Evers was assassinated—segregationists refused to be moved. Even in these seeming defeats, King sees victory in the way African-Americans in such communities maintained their unity in the face of opposition.

For King, the demonstrations are not the end of this movement; they instead represent the possibility for lasting change: “[a] social movement that only moves people is merely a revolt. A movement that changes both people and institutions is a revolution” (142). The impact of the summer of 1963 can be seen, for example, in the slow growth of employment opportunities for African-Americans, some of which are admittedly a result of tokenism. Businesses are discovering they can no longer ignore employment discrimination without receiving criticism from many quarters. The Kennedy administration has put passing civilrights legislation back on its priority list.

In the third part of the chapter, King discusses the two immediate effects of the demonstrations of 1963, namely the increase in allies for the freedom movement and the hardening of the opposition.

A broad alliance of new SCLC affiliates sprang up, and other organizations, content until 1963 to make statements in support of civil rights, became actively involved and asked their members to participate in marches. Even faith organizations participated, a point King makes by describing the spectacle of ministers, priests, and rabbis mingling with ordinary people in jail cells after their arrests.

Opposition to the turns theCivil Rights Movement was taking came from a surprising group: moderates who made it clear that they saw order as being more important than injustice by the fall of 1963. These moderates’ passivity and willingness to accept only token changes placed them on a collision course with the broader aims of the Civil Rights Movement. Moderate “[r]esentment, impatience with militancy, and aloofness” made this group “temporary obstacles,” but King still believes they can be transformed into allies (146).

The response of these seeming allies indicates the degree to which white supremacy is engrained in American history and culture. King offers an account of the founding of the nation as one “born in [the] genocide” of Native Americans (146). This genocide is celebrated as a “moral crusade” and is a central part of American identity (147). This “massive base of racism” at the start of the nation is the foundation for prejudice against all nonwhites and is so “woven” into the American consciousness that it has damaged democracy (143).

African-Americans cannot confront racism with weapons, based on the outcome for Native Americans. Nor can they simply submit because doing so “reinforces the myth that one race is inherently inferior to another” (147). Nonviolent direct action undercuts this myth because it requires “extensive sacrifice, bravery and skill” (148). African-Americans’ willingness to fight for American ideals of freedom instead of compromising will ultimately win over the majority of Americans, King argues. Those who see their methods as “too aggressive” are out of step with ordinary Americans in the North and South, who are mostly in favor of integration, a point King supports with survey data from a 1963 Newsweek survey on civil rights(148).

In the fourth part of the chapter, King describes the rationale and planning behind the March on Washington. Organized by civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph, the march was designed to unite the various forces into a national movement for civil rights. Some “prophets of doom” feared violence at the proposed march would destroy the chances of national civil rights legislation being passed (149). People who accepted African-Americans as capable people supported the march, while those who allowed timidity to overwhelm them, or even doubted the ability of African-Americans to organize such a march, opposed it.

The “spectacle” of 250,00 people, a mix of celebrities and ordinary people from all over the country, gave African-Americans a greater appreciation for their own race (150). King describes the large crowd gathered there as an army whose only weapon was the powerful one of love. Among the marchers were representatives of most of the major white churches. While the National Council of the AFL-CIO chose to skip the march, other local and international unions chose to show up.

The march was broadcast on national television, allowing many whites to get their first look at “Negroes engaged in a serious occupation,” a blow to stereotypes of African-Americans (152-153). The world also looked on. King closes with the thought that all Americans should feel a sense of national pride in the march.